[1]刘志勇. 基于销售努力成本共担的信息产品供应链收入共享契约[J].科技与管理,2015,17(06):54-58.[doi:10. 16315 / j. stm. 2015. 06. 010]
 LIU Zhi-yong. Revenue-sharing contract of information product’s supply chain with sale effort cost partaking[J].Science-Technology and Management,2015,17(06):54-58.[doi:10. 16315 / j. stm. 2015. 06. 010]
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 基于销售努力成本共担的信息产品供应链收入共享契约
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《科技与管理》[ISSN:1008-7133/CN:23-1445/C3]

卷:
17卷
期数:
2015年06
页码:
54-58
栏目:
理论探讨
出版日期:
2015-11-15

文章信息/Info

Title:
 Revenue-sharing contract of information product’s supply chain with sale effort cost partaking
文章编号:
1008 -7133( 2015) 06 -0054 -05
作者:
 刘志勇
 华南理工大学 工商管理学院
Author(s):
 LIU Zhi-yong
 School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology
关键词:
 供应链协调 收入共享契约 努力因素 成本共担
Keywords:
 supply chain coordination revenue sharing contract effect cost partaking
分类号:
F 274
DOI:
10. 16315 / j. stm. 2015. 06. 010
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
 研究表明当考虑到销售商的努力程度影响市场需求的时候,传统的收入共享契约不能够协调供应链。本文以单一信息产品供应商和零售商组成的供应链结构为研究对象,提出了销售努力成本由供应和销售双方共担的收入共享契约,很好的解决了单纯的收益共享契约无法实现供应链协调的问题。该契约结构参数简单,且易于操作实施。最后,通过具体实例对模型进行了比较分析,并得到了最优的收入分配比例。结论表明该新契约实施后,供应链双方的收益都能得到提高。
Abstract:
 As an effective method to coordinate supply chain,revenue sharing contract cannot function when the demand is uncertain and dependent on retailer’s sale effort. Based on a supply chain with one single information product supplier serving one retailer,the aforementioned result is explained through the theoretical analysis. To deal with the problem,a new revenue sharing contract with sale effort cost partaking was therefore proposed,supply chain coordination was achieved. The contract is apt to implement because of few contract parameters. Finally a numerical example was given to illustrate the model and obtain the optimal allocation proportion of revenue. The proposed model demonstrated that both supplier and retailer can gain more profit when the new contract is applied.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
 收稿日期: 2015 -07 -20
基金项目: 中国博士后科学基金项目( 2015M572327)
作者简介: 刘志勇( 1979—) ,男,博士
更新日期/Last Update: 2016-03-15